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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Petitioner-Appellant, Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), appeals from the 
denial of his successive post-conviction petition stemming from his trial that resulted in 
two death sentences, but was subsequently remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court for 
resentencing. Shackelford's successive post-conviction appeal has been consolidated 
with the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition stemming from his 
resentencing where he was given two consecutive fixed life sentences. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The facts leading to Shackelford's convictions were summarized by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Shackelford (Shackelford I), 150 Idaho 355, 361-62, 247 P.3d 
582 (2010) (footnote omitted), as follows: 
Dale Shackelford was convicted of the murders of his ex-wife, 
Donna Fontaine, and her boyfriend, Fred Palahniuk, which occurred near 
the Latah County town of Kendrick, Idaho, in May 1999. The State 
alleged that Shackelford conspired with Martha Millar, Bernadette 
Lasater, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, and, John Abitz. Millar and Lasater 
worked for Shackelford' s trucking business, Shackelford Enterprises, in 
Missouri. The Abitz family lived near the residence where the bodies of 
Donna and Fred were found. Sonja Abitz was Shackelford's fiancee at the 
time of the murders, and John and Mary Abitz are Sonja's parents. The 
alleged conspirators eventually pled guilty to charges related to the 
murders. 
Shackelford and Donna married in Missouri in December 1995 and 
the relationship ended in the summer of 1997, with the couple divorcing in 
November of that year. Donna accused Shackelford of raping her in July 
1997, and charges were filed in 1998. In the spring of 1999, Donna 
developed a relationship with Fred and, on May 28, 1999, the two visited 
Donna's brother, Gary Fontaine, at the home Gary and Donna's daughter 
owned together outside of Kendrick. The morning of May 29, Donna, 
Fred, and Gary went to the Locust Blossom Festival in Kendrick, where 
they met John, Mary, and Sonja Abitz. 
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After leaving the festival, Gary went to the Abitz' s house, but he 
left around dark, returned home, noticed Donna's pickup in the driveway, 
and smelled smoke. Gary called the Abitz's house and reported that his 
two-story garage was on fire. Mary, Sonja, Ted Meske (Mary's brother), 
and Shackelford arrived at the fire and various individuals tried to 
extinguish it, but were unsuccessful. 
At 7 :40 p.m., Latah County Sheriff Patrol Deputy Richard Skiles 
was called to investigate the fire at 2168 Three Bear Road. When Skiles 
arrived at the scene, nearly an hour later, he observed several persons -
including Gary Fontaine, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, Brian Abitz (Sonja's 
brother), Ted Meske, and Shackelford- standing near the garage that was 
completely engulfed in flames. Based upon information obtained from 
Ted and Shackelford, Deputy Skiles contacted dispatch to have an on-call 
detective sent "because there was a possibility there could be a suicide 
victim in the fire." By the time the fire department arrived, the garage had 
been utterly destroyed. Several hours later, after the fire had been 
extinguished, two bodies were found in the rubble. The bodies were 
subsequently identified as the remains of Donna and Fred. At trial, a state 
fire investigator testified as to his opinion that the fire was arson. 
Doctor Robert Cihak conducted autopsies of the remains, which 
were severely burned. Shotgun pellets were found in Donna's right chest 
region and a bullet was found in the back of her neck. Dr. Cihak opined 
that the bullet wound was fatal and was inflicted when Donna was still 
alive. A bullet was also found in Fred's body behind the upper 
breastbone, which Dr. Cihak concluded was the cause of death. Dr. Cihak 
offered his opinion that Donna and Fred were dead at the time of the fire. 
An Indictment was filed charging Shackelford with two counts of first-degree 
murder, first-degree arson, two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, 
conspiracy to commit arson, and preparing false evidence. (#27966, R., pp.1-4.) 1 At the 
conclusion of his trial, a jury found Shackelford guilty of all the charged offenses. (Id., 
pp.2223-31.) The district court subsequently found the state proved two statutory 
1 Contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a Motion to Take 
Judicial Notice requesting this Court take judicial notice of the Clerk's Records and 
Reporter's Transcripts in Shackelford's underlying capital case and his resentencing. The 
state will refer to the records and transcripts by their respective Idaho Supreme Court 
numbers, and to Shackelford's opening brief as "Brief." 
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aggravating factors involving Donna's murder, one statutory aggravating factor involving 
Fred's murder, weighed the collective mitigation against each individual statutory 
aggravator, and sentenced Shackelford to death for both murders. (Id., pp.3082-3116.) 
As to the remaining crimes, Shackelford was given a fixed twenty-five years for first-
degree arson, fixed life for one count of conspiracy to commit murder, a fixed twenty-
five years for the second count of conspiracy to commit murder, and a fixed five years for 
preparing false evidence, all to run concurrently with each other. (Id., pp.3123-25.) 
With the assistance of the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"), 
Shackelford filed his initial post-conviction petition (#31928, R., pp.10-35), a third 
amended petition (id., pp.2534-2642), and an addendum to his third amended petition 
(id., pp.2980-90). The district court denied his motion to file a second addendum to the 
third amended petition. (Id., pp.3175-182, 3196-3429, 3438-41.) The district court 
granted Shackelford sentencing relief, concluding, based upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002), that the jury was mandated to conduct the weighing process in death penalty 
cases and, therefore, ordering that Shackelford's death sentences be "set aside." (#31928, 
R., pp.3580-84.) Based upon the decision to provide Shackelford sentencing relief, the 
court concluded three other sentencing claims were moot. (Id., pp.3628-29.) All of 
Shackelford's remaining guilt and sentencing claims were denied. (Id., pp.3569-3631.) 
Shackelford and the state appealed. (#31928, R., pp.3702-09.) In a consolidated 
appeal pursuant to LC. § 19-2719, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Shackelford's 
convictions, prison sentences, and the determination that Shackelford had to be 
resentenced for both first-degree murders, albeit on different grounds, concluding the jury 
did not find the statutory aggravating factors and that the error was not harmless. 
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Shackelford I, 150 Idaho at 386-88. Both parties' petitions for certiorari were denied on 
March 7, 2011. Shackelford v. Idaho, 562 U.S. 1272 (2011); Idaho v. Shackelford, 562 
U.S. 1279 (2011). 
On March 18, 2011, Shackelford filed a "[Successive] Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief Capital Case" ("Successive Petition") (#42331-2014, R., pp.18-42) 
(brackets in original), and a Motion for Appointment of Counsel (id., pp.15-17).2 The 
state filed an answer (id., pp.43-55) and a Motion for Summary Disposition (id., pp.73-
75). On July 8, 2011, the district court denied all pending motions and suspended the 
case pending the outcome of Shackelford's resentencing. (Id., pp.I 00-06.) 
In Shackelford's criminal case, the state filed a Notice of State's Decision to Not 
Seek Death Penalty on Resentencing ("Notice"). (#39398, R., pp.14-20.) Shackelford 
responded to the state's Notice, contending he was still entitled to jury sentencing 
because, according to Shackelford, he could only be sentenced to indeterminate life with 
the first ten years fixed unless a jury found at least one statutory aggravating factor. (Id., 
pp.36-42.) Shackelford raised the same argument in his Motion for a Specific Sentence 
(id., pp.99-101) and Resentencing Memorandum (id., pp.120-25). The district court 
rejected Shackelford's argument (id., p.139), and sentenced him to fixed life for both 
murders to be served consecutively with each other and the other six non-capital 
sentences (id., pp.144-48). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Shackelford's fixed life 
sentences. State v. Shackelford (Shackelford ID, 155 Idaho 454,314 P.3d 136 (2013). 
2 Shackelford's first post-conviction case was initially given district court Case No. SPOl-
00366. (#31928, R., p.10.) For unknown reasons, that number was changed to Case No. 
CV-2001-0004272. (Id., p.1387.) Additionally, for unknown reasons, Shackelford's 
Successive Petition was eventually given the same case number as his first post-
_conviction case, Case No. CV-2001-0004272. 
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Shackelford filed a pro se Motion to Set Scheduling Conference in his Successive 
Petition case, notifying the district court that proceedings from his resentencing had been 
concluded. (#42331, R., pp.180-81.) Shackelford filed a prose Motion to Amend with 
an accompanying amended petition (id., pp.182-226) and a Motion to Appoint Counsel 
(id., pp.226-27). The state responded by incorporating its prior pleadings and renewing 
its prior Motion for Summary Dismissal. (Id., pp.230-34.) 
The same day he sought to renew his Successive Petition case, Shackelford filed 
his pro se Application for Post-Conviction Relief ("Resentencing Petition") challenging 
the two fixed life sentences for first-degree murder, and requesting appointment of 
counsel. (#42182, R., pp.6-9.) The state responded by requesting summary dismissal by 
attaching its latest response from Shackelford' s Successive Petition case. (Id., pp.13-15.) 
After conducting a consolidated hearing on the parties' pending motions (#42331, 
R., pp.236-37; #42182, R., pp.21-22) and permitting Shackelford to amend his 
Successive Petition ("Amended Successive Petition") (#42331, R., pp.183-25), the 
district court denied Shackelford's motions for counsel and granted the state's motions 
for summary dismissal (#42331, R., pp.238-48; #42182, R., pp.23-28). Shackelford filed 
timely notices of appeal in both cases. (#42331, R., pp.249-51; #42182, R., pp.29-31.) 
Amended notices of appeal were filed (#42331, R. pp.260-65; #42182, R., pp., 43-46) 
because the Judgment in each case was not filed until after the initial notices of appeal 
were filed (#42331, R., pp.258-59; #42182, R., pp.41-42). 
Appellate counsel was appointed in both cases. (#42331, R., pp.254-56; #42182, 
R., pp.36-38.) However, counsel filed a motion to withdraw in both cases because, in 
Shackelford's Successive Petition appeal, counsel "determined that [he] cannot file an 
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opening brief raising all the issues [ ] Shackelford wishes to present to the Court and 
comply with I.AR. 11.2( a)" (Appendix A, p. l ), and in the Resentencing Petition appeal, 
counsel "determined that [he] cannot file an opening brief and comply with I.AR. l l .2(a) 
(Appendix B, p.1). Counsel's motions were granted (Appendices C, D), and the appeals 
were consolidated by the Idaho Supreme Court (Appendix E). 
ISSUES 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Has Shackelford failed to establish the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his Amended Successive Petition because he has failed to address all 
of the reasons for the district court's denial of his Amended Successive Petition, 
and because the claims are barred by LC. § 19-4901(b), the doctrine of res 
judicata, and/or I.C. § 19-4908? 
2. Has Shackelford failed to establish the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his Resentencing Petition because the claim is barred by I.C. § 19-
4901(b) and fails on the merits? 
3. Has Shackelford failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
denying him appointed counsel during his successive post-conviction case? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred Bv Summarily Dismissing 
His Amended Successive Petition 
A Introduction 
The district court identified seven claims from Shackelford's Amended 
Successive Petition, which include: 
(i) [T]his court erred in instructing the jury on accomplice liability in 
Instruction No. 33, (ii) ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object 
to Instruction No. 33, (iii) the State failed to disclose forensic evidence to 
Shackelford, violating his due process rights, (iv) ineffective assistance of 
counsel in failing to impeach Lucien Haag and failing to independently 
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investigate forensic evidence, (v) prosecutorial misconduct in vouching 
for witness credibility, (vi) the court's sentencing for the conspiracy count 
exceeded the maximum allowed by law, and (vii) ineffective assistance of 
post-conviction counsel. 
(#42331, R., p.239.) The court dismissed the claims under several different theories, 
including: (1) res judicata because some claims were raised in Shackelford's prior 
appeal; (2) LC. § 19-4901(b) because some claims could have been raised in his prior 
direct appeal; and/or (3) they fail on the merits. (Id., pp.241-46.) 
On appeal, Shackelford has only raised the following claims: (1) whether the 
district court erred in dismissing his claim regarding Instruction 33 (Claim A); (2) 
whether the district erred by failing to rule on his ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim based upon Instruction 33 (Claim B); (3) whether the district court erred by 
dismissing his claims regarding alleged Brady3 violations (Claim C); (4) whether the 
district court erred in dismissing his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for 
allegedly failing to investigate ballistics data (Claim D); (5) whether the district court 
erred in dismissing his prosecutorial misconduct claim based upon alleged vouching 
during closing argument (Claim E); and (6) whether the district court erred by dismissing 
his sentencing claim regarding conspiracy to commit murder (Claim F); he has not raised 
the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel claim or an ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel claim that was raised in his Amended Successive Petition. 
Because Shackelford has failed to address the district court's alternative basis for 
dismissing Claims A, C, D, And E, - they are barred under LC. § 19-4901(b) because 
they could have been raised on direct appeal - the district court's decision should be 
affirmed with respect to those claims. Even if Shackelford had addressed LC. § 19-
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1983). 
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4901(b), because Claims A, C, E, and F could have been raised on direct appeal, the 
district court should be affirmed with respect to those claims. Moreover, several of his 
claims fail under the doctrine of res judicata. Finally, all the claims in his Amended 
Successive Petition are barred under LC. § 19-4908. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quotes and 
citation omitted), the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard of review in post-
conviction cases in which summary dismissal was granted: 
C. 
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is 
properly granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to 
the petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief 
if accepted as true. A court is required to accept the petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's 
conclusions. The standard to be applied to a trial court's determination 
that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of determination as in 
a summary judgment proceeding. 
Shackelford Has Not Addressed The District Court's Alternative Basis For 
Dismissing Claims A, C, D, And E 
Relying upon State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208,210, 766 P.2d 678 (1988) (citing LC. 
§ 19-490l(b)), the district court used an alternative basis for dismissing Claims A, C, D, 
and E -they could have been raised in Shackelford's direct appeal. (#42331, R., pp.241-
46.) Addressing Claim A, the court, as an alternative basis for dismissal, explained: 
Shackelford was able to complain regarding some aspects of instruction 
No. 33 on direct appeal, and there is no explanation why the current 
arguments were not raised then. Because these new arguments could have 
been raised on direct appeal and were not, they are now barred in the post-
conviction action. Beam, 115 Idaho at 210, 766 P.2d at 680. 
(Id., p.242.) 
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Addressing Claim C, the district court, as an alternative basis for dismissal, 
reasoned, "Shackelford's claims regarding this evidence are barred, because they could 
previously have been raised on appeal, but were not." (Id., p.244) (citing Beam, 115 
Idaho at 210). Discussing Claim D, the district court noted Shackelford "argued similar 
points in his prior criminal appeal" and "offers no explanation as to why he did not 
address the low mass bullet and Lucien Haag's testimony at that time." (Id.) As an 
alternative basis for dismissal, the district court also dismissed Claim E because of 
Shackelford's "failure to raise this issue on the prior appeal." (Id., p.245.) 
When a district court provides an alternative basis for its ruling that is not 
challenged by the appellant, the decision of the court must be affirmed. In Henman v. 
State, 132 Idaho 49, 50, 966 P.2d 49 (Ct. App.1998), the petitioner filed a post-conviction 
petition contending he was placed in jeopardy when his property was seized pursuant to 
Idaho's Illegal Drng Tax Act, which, he contended, resulted in his cocaine conviction 
constituting a double jeopardy violation. The district court denied post-conviction relief 
on two alternative grounds. Id. at 51. On appeal, the petitioner challenged only one of 
the district court's rulings. Id. Because the court's second basis for denial of relief was 
not challenged in the petitioner's opening brief, the court of appeals affirmed without 
addressing the merits of the lower court's first basis for denying relief. Id. 
Similarly, in State v. Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 365-66, 956 .2d 1311 (Ct. App. 
1998) ( quotes and citation omitted), the court of appeals addressed the defendant's failure 
to challenge the district court's alternative bases for denial of his motion to suppress, 
explaining, "where a judgment of the trial court is based upon alternative grounds, the 
fact that one of the grounds may be in error is of no consequence and may be disregarded 
9 
if the judgment can be sustained upon one of the other grounds." See also Brown v. 
Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156, 165, 335 P.3d 1 (2014) (quotes, brackets, and citations 
omitted) ("It is well settled that where a trial court grants summary judgment on two 
independent grounds and the appellant challenges only one of those grounds on appeal, 
the judgment must be affirmed."); State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517-518, 164 P.3d 
790, 797-798 (2007), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional 
Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011) ("Where a lower court makes a ruling 
based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, 
the appellate court must affirm on the uncontested basis."). 
While Shackelford later notes the district court dismissed his claims under LC. § 
19-4901 (b) and Beam, supra (Brief, p.18), he fails to argue the court erred by relying 
upon I.C. § 19-4901(b). Rather, without citation to any authority, Shackelford refers to 
everything after the district court's initial basis for dismissal - res judicata - as "dictum." 
(Brief, p.6.) This is incorrect because the district court's decision based upon LC. § 19-
4901(b) is not "dictum," but an alternative basis for dismissal that Shackelford has failed 
to address. Cf Petersen v. State, 87 Idaho 351, 365, 393 P.2d 585 (1964) (concluding 
that statements in the court's prior opinion that did not appear "to have played a role in 
the ultimate decision of the court" are dicta). The district court's discussion regarding 
I.C. § 19-4901(b) clearly "played a role in the ultimate decision of the court." 
Because Shackelford has not challenged the district court's alternative basis under 
LC. § 19-4901(b), the district court's decision regarding those claims must be affirmed. 
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D. Shackelford's Substantive Claims Are Barred Under LC. 19 § 19-490l(b) 
Claims A, C, E, and F are substantive claims that should have been raised in 
Shackelford's direct appeal Relying upon LC. § 19-4901(b),4 the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated, "The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for post-
conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. A claim or issue which was or could 
have been raised on appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings." 
Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348 (1997) (quotes, brackets and citations 
omitted); see also Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 606, 21 P.3d 924 (2001) ("It is 
well established that applicants for post-conviction relief are not allowed to raise issues in 
post-conviction proceedings that could have been raised on direct appeal unless the issues 
were not known and could not reasonably have been known during the direct appeal."). 
Even if Shackelford had addressed the bar associated with LC. § 19-4901(b), his 
argument would fail because Claims A, C, E, and F are substantive claims that should 
have been raised in Shackelford's direct appeal. 5 Because Shackelford has articulated no 
4 Idaho Code§ 19-4901(b) provides, in pertinent part: 
Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was 
not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, 
unless it appears to the court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing 
by affidavit, deposition or otherwise, that the asserted basis for relief 
raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and 
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier. 
5 Because Claims B and D are ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, they should 
not have been raised on direct appeal. In State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 375-76, 859 
P.2d 972 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals extensively addressed the issue of whether 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be raised on direct appeal or post-
conviction, explaining, "it is generally inappropriate to raise a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal from the judgment of conviction. Rather, such 
claims are more appropriately presented through post-conviction relief proceedings 
where an evidentiary record can be developed." The Idaho Supreme Court adopted 
Mitchell's rationale in State v. Zaitseva, 135 Idaho 11, 14-15, 13 P.3d 338 (2000). 
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reason why these four claims could not have been raised in his direct appeal, their 
dismissal should be affirmed on appeal. See Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 474, 224 
P.3d 536 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Barcella did not articulate any reason or point to any 
allegation or evidence as to why the claim should survive the bar of LC.§ 19-4901(b)."). 
This is particularly true because Shackelford had notice from the state that his claims are 
barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) prior to the district court's ruling. In its Answer, the state 
asserted the claims are barred by LC.§§ 19-4901(b) and 19-4908. (#42331, R., pp.52-
53.) In its Motion for Summary Disposition the state moved for summary dismissal "for 
the reasons detailed in the State's Answer" and further averred that Shackelford "fails to 
raise any issues that were not or could not have been raised in said appeal." (#42331, R. 
pp. 73-74.) That motion was renewed after Shackelford filed his Amended Successive 
Petition. (Id., pp.230-34.) Further, the state's position was reiterated at the hearing when 
the prosecutor stated, "The successive petition ... doesn't allege anything that either 
wasn't already raised in either prior post-conviction or appellate proceedings or could and 
should have been raised previously." (#42182, Tr., p.18.) 
Because Claims A, C, E, and F are substantive claims that should have been 
raised in Shackelford's direct appeal, the district court's decision regarding these four 
claims should be affirmed on appeal. 
E. Claims A, B, C, And D, Are Barred Under The Res Judicata Doctrine 
The district court found Claims A, B, C, and D are barred by res judicata. 
(#42331, R., pp.241-44.) In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613 
(2007), the supreme court discussed the purposes behind res judicata: 
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(1) [I]t preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the 
corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice 
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it 
advances the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive 
claims. 
While "[t]he doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res 
judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)," "[s]eparate tests are used to 
determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Id. Five factors are 
required for issue preclusion, which include: 
(1) [T]he party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the 
issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in 
the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually 
decided in the prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final judgment on the merits 
in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted 
was a party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation. 
Id. at 124. 
There are three requirements for claim preclusion, "(1) same parties; (2) same 
claim; and (3) final judgment." Id. "[T]he 'sameness' of a claim for res judicata 
purposes is determined by examining the operative facts underlying the two causes of 
action. State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, ---, 343 P.3d 497, 505 (2015). "Claim preclusion 
bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but 
also as to 'every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."' 
Ticor, 144 Idaho at 126 (quoting Magic Valley Radiology. P.A. v. Kolouch, 1234 Idaho 
434,437, 849 P.2d 107 (1993)). 
The doctrine of res judicata has been applied in both criminal, State v. Creech, 
132 Idaho 1, 9 n.1, 966 P.2d 1 (1998), and post-conviction cases, Schultz v. State, 153 
Idaho 791,797,291 P.3d 474 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing cases). In Creech, 132 Idaho at 10-
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12, 15, the supreme court declined to address issues and claims that were decided in a 
prior state appeal and issues and claims previously decided by the Ninth Circuit during 
federal habeas proceedings. As explained by the court, "[W]hen legal issues are decided 
in a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata from raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Similarly, when 
an issue is decided in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the doctrine of res judicata 
applies to prevent the issue from being addressed again by this Court on remand." Id. at 
9 n.1 ( citations omitted). 
Likewise, the doctrine has been applied in the context of cases involving LC.R. 
35. In State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 482, 11 P.3d 481 (2000), the supreme court 
applied res judicata to a Rule 35 motion that was raised before the district court, but 
never appealed, and then raised in a second Rule 3 5 motion that was appealed. The 
supreme court reasoned, "the doctrine of res judicata can be applied to bar consideration 
of subsequent Rule 3 5 motions to the extent those motions attempt to relitigate issues 
already finally decided in earlier Rule 35 motions." Id. The court also rejected Rhoades' 
contention that the second Rule 35 motion "is not the same issue litigated earlier," 
concluding, "[w]hile the two motions may be worded somewhat differently, they 
nevertheless encompass the same issue: namely, whether the district judge erred in giving 
Rhoades a separate sentence enhancement for each crime for which he was convicted, 
rather than a single sentence enhancement for his entire course of conduct." Id. at 84 3. 
The district court concluded Claim A was barred under resjudicata. (#42331, R., 
pp.241-42.) In his direct appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court characterized Shackelford' s 
prior claim regarding Jury Instruction 33 as follows: 
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Shackelford asserts that the district court erred in reading 
Instruction 33 to the jury, setting forth a theory of accomplice liability, 
because there was no language charging Shackelford with aiding and 
abetting in the Indictment and thus there was nothing to put Shackelford 
on notice to prepare a defense to these charges. He also argues that the 
instruction was ambiguous because none of the instructions regarding his 
participation in the murders of Donna and Fred, the arson, or the preparing 
of false evidence directed the jury to find that he had aided and abetted 
any of these crimes. 
Shackelford I, 150 Idaho at 378. 
Because Idaho has abolished the distinction between principals and aiders and 
abettors, the supreme court rejected Shackelford's claim because Instruction 33 "stated 
the applicable law ... [ and] did not mislead the jury or fail to put [him] on notice of the 
charge because I.C. § 19-1430 allows an aider and abettor to be charged as a principal 
and 'no other facts need be alleged in any indictment' because the distinction between the 
two is abrogated." Id. at 379. 
Shackelford now contends Claim A in his Amended Successive Petition includes 
the following additional arguments: 
i). The evidence was insufficient to present the Instruction No. 33 to the 
jury; ii). Submission oflnstruction No. 33 removed the need for the jury to 
find the actus reas; iii). Jury Instruction No. 33 shifted the burden of proof 
from the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element 
of the crimes charged, and; (iv). Instruction no. 33, in combination with 
instructions on conspiracy counts (IV & V) removed the need for the state 
to prove that Shackelford, as either a principle or accomplice, committed 
any of the overt acts set forth in the Indictment. (R., 190 - 200). 
(Brief, pp.5-6.) 
Shackelford's new arguments do not salvage Claim A under res judicata. The 
Idaho Supreme Court's determination that Instruction 33 "stated the applicable law as 
laid out in LC. § 19-1430 and [State v.] Johnson, [145 Idaho 970, 973, 188 P.2d 912 
(2008)]," and "did not mislead the jury," necessarily covers all of the "new arguments" 
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Shackelford raised in his Amended Successive Petition and is now raising on appeal. 
The state was not required to establish the elements of aiding and abetting because there 
is no distinction between aiders and abettors and principles. As such, Claim A fails under 
res judicata both because it was raised before the Idaho Supreme Court and because 
"new reasons" asserted to support a prior claim do not prevent the court from denying his 
claim under resjudicata. Johnson v. State, 2015 WL 1881943, *3 (Idaho Ct. App. 2015). 
As recognized in Andrus v. Nicholson, 145 Idaho 774, 777, 186 P.3d 630 (2008), 
"[C]laim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata is not limited to theories there were 
actually litigated in the prior lawsuit." Indeed, in his Amended Successive Petition, 
Shackelford only contended he was "provid[ing] additional factual and legal support for 
the claim that Instruction no. 33 was improperly given." (#42331, R., p.207.) 
Claim B was also properly dismissed under res judicata because the first prong of 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim involving jury instructions generally requires a 
determination of the merits of the claim. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, Shackelford must show his counsel's representation was deficient and that the 
deficiency was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The 
first element "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. 
The second element requires Shackelford to show "counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687. Because the supreme court addressed the merits associated with using Instruction 
33 and found nothing wrong with Instruction 33 in Shackelford's direct appeal, the court 
necessarily found there would have been no deficient performance associated with the 
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instruction. See Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104-06, 190 F.3d 920 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(finding deficient performance when trial counsel failed to object to an instruction that 
lowered the state's burden of proof). Therefore, because the first prong of Strickland was 
decided in Shackelford's first appeal, the entirety of Claim Bis barred under res judicata 
because of issue preclusion. 
More importantly, in his Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 
along with other ineffective assistance of counsel claims based upon jury instructions, 
Shackelford raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon Instruction 33. 
(#31928, R., pp.2589-92.) While there were no post-conviction claims raised on appeal 
challenging counsel's performance with regard to the jury instructions, that is not 
required for res judicata to apply. Indeed, in Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, the supreme 
court applied res judicata to a claim that was initially raised in the first Rule 3 5 motion, 
but was not appealed, and then raised in a second Rule 3 5 motion and appealed. Because 
Rhoades sought to "relitigate the same issue already decided by the district judge and not 
appealed," the claim was barred under res judicata when it was raised again in the second 
Rule 3 5 motion and appealed. Id. at 483. 
Claim C, which is a Brady claim challenging the testimony of Dr. Robert Ciak, 
was also found by the district court to be barred under res judicata. (#42331, R., p.243.) 
During his first post-conviction case, Shackelford raised a Brady claim challenging Dr. 
Ciak's testimony based upon the state's failure to provide notes from Dr. John Howard 
that allegedly could have been used to challenge the time of death. 6 Shackelford I, 150 
Idaho at 380-81. The supreme court concluded Shackelford's claim failed because he did 
6 In his Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Shackelford made other 
allegations involving Brady that were not raised on appeal. (#31928, R., pp.2543-47.) 
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not establish how the evidence "would have undermined the testimony, nor how he was 
prejudiced by any failure to disclose the note." Id. at 381. Because the supreme court 
addressed the prejudice prong of the Brady claim and "claim preclusion" is "not limited 
to theories that were actually litigated in the prior suit," Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777, the 
district court did not err by rejecting Claim C under res judicata. 
Additionally, Shackelford raised this exact issue in his Second Addendum to 
Third Amended Petition. (#31928, R., pp.3219-21.) While the district court denied 
Shackelford's motion to file the Second Addendum (id., pp.3438-41), he did not appeal 
the denial of the motion or otherwise challenge the merits of the claim. As a result, 
Claim C falls under Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, because Shackelford is attempting to 
relitigate the same issue that was rejected by the district court and not appealed when it 
was raised in the Second Addendum. 
Shackelford contends res judicata does not bar consideration of the merits of 
Claim C because of ineffective assistance of post-conviction and appellate counsel. 
(Brief, p.11.) However, the state is unaware of any authority, and none is cited by 
Shackelford, that excuses a claim dismissed based upon res judicata because of the 
alleged ineffectiveness of post-conviction or appellate counsel. 
As recognized by the district court (#42331, R., p.244), Claim D is also barred by 
res judicata. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Shackelford contended 
trial counsel were ineffective for failing to impeach two other witnesses. 7 Shackelford I, 
150 Idaho at 384. Addressing the issue of prejudice, the supreme court rejected 
7 In his Third Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Shackelford made many 
other allegations of ineffective assistance based upon trial counsels' cross-examination of 
witnesses. (#31928, R., pp.2565-71.) 
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Shackelford's claim, explaining, "counsel were not ineffective in the impeachment of the 
State's witnesses as Shackelford has not demonstrated that counsel's conduct so 
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result." Id. ( quotes and citation omitted). The 
supreme court also discussed the claim associated with counsel's alleged failure to 
properly prepare the defense expert witness, and concluded Shackelford "was not 
prejudiced by any deficiencies in counsel's preparation of Perkins." Id. at 385. Because 
the supreme court addressed the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims and "claim preclusion" is "not limited to theories that were actually 
litigated in the prior suit," Andrus, 145 Idaho at 777, the district court did not err by 
rejecting Claim D under res judicata. 
Claim D was also raised in Shackelford's Second Addendum, which was rejected 
by the district court but not raised in his capital appeal. (#31928, pp.3216-19.) 
Therefore, because Shackelford is attempting to relitigate the same issue that was rejected 
by the district court and not appealed when it was raised in the Second Addendum, it is 
barred under resjudicata. Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863. 
Shackelford has failed to establish the district court's rationale for dismissing 
these four claims based upon res judicata was error. 
F. All Of Shackelford's Claims Are Barred Under LC. § 19-4908 
Because the district court concluded Shackelford's claims had been previously 
raised and were barred under res judicata or were claims that should have been raised in 
his direct appeal under LC. § 19-4901 (b ), it appears the court may not have relied upon 
LC. § 19-4908 as a basis to dismiss Shackelford's Amended Successive Petition. (Id., 
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pp.238-48.) Irrespective, should any of Shackelford's claims fall outside the res judicata 
doctrine or LC. § 19-490l(b), this Court can still affirm the district court under LC. § 19-
4908 because the state provided proper notice in its Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906( c) permits the district court to "grant a motion by either 
party for summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together 
with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." When the state files a motion 
for summary disposition that "state[ s] with particularity the grounds therefore," the 
district court is absolved of providing twenty-days notice of its intent to dismiss as 
required by LC. § 19-4906(b). Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 
795 (1995) ( citation omitted). The "particularity" requirement does not require detail, but 
only "reasonable particularity" that limits the opposing party from asserting "surprise or 
prejudice." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148 (2009). 
Even if the district court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this 
Court may affirm the order based upon the correct theory. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 
159, 164, 321 P.3d 709 (2014). In Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225 
(Ct. App. 1996), the court of appeals affirmed based upon an alternative basis that was 
properly pled in the state's motion to dismiss even though that alternative basis was not 
relied upon by the district court. Therefore, if Shackelford had sufficient notice of a 
theory of dismissal based upon the state's pleadings, this Court can affirm even if that 
theory was not addressed by the district court. 
Idaho Code§ 19-4908 states: 
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All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must 
be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any 
ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or 
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief 
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a 
ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or 
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended 
application. 
In its Motion for Summary Dismissal, the state specifically stated its basis for 
dismissal was "the reasons detailed in the State's Answer." (#42332, R., p.73.) In its 
Answer, the state averred, "the issues [Shackelford] attempts to raise were either 
previously raised and addressed or have been waived, and there is no basis alleged to 
support a finding that 'sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental or amended application' for any of the instant claimed grounds for 
relief. See Idaho Code § 19-4908." (Id., p.49.) Moreover, as an affirmative defense the 
state asserted, "To the extent [Shackelford's] claims should have been raised in the 
original post-conviction proceeding or on direct appeal, the claims are procedurally 
defaulted, barred as res judicata, and collaterally and statutorily estopped. Idaho Code §§ 
19-4901(b) and 19-4908." (Id., pp.52-53.) The state's motion was subsequently renewed 
after Shackelford filed his Amended Successive Petition. (Id., pp.230-234.) 
The state recognizes that in Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322, the Idaho Supreme 
Court reversed the dismissal of a post-conviction case because dismissal was premised 
upon the state's answer. However, Saykhamchone is distinguishable because in 
Shackelford's case the state filed a Motion for Summary Disposition (#42331, R., pp.73-
75) that was subsequently renewed after Shackelford filed his Successive Amended 
Petition (id., pp.230-34). See Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 823-24, 164 P.3d 798 
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(2007). While the state's motion was based, in part, upon the "reasons detailed in the 
State's Answer," as explained above, that answer provided Shackelford with "reasonable 
particularity" that limited him from asserting "surprise or prejudice." (Id., pp.43-55.) 
Therefore, contrary to his contention (Brief, p.31 ), Shackelford was given very clear 
advance notice of a basis that could be utilized by the district court for dismissal of his 
Amended Successive Petition. Because, all of the claims in Shackelford's Amended 
Successive Petition could have been raised in his first post-conviction petition, the district 
court should be affirmed. Indeed, Shackelford acknowledges his Amended Successive 
Petition falls under LC.§ 19-4908 by its very caption, which states, "Successive." 
However, if Shackelford can establish "sufficient reason" for not asserting these 
new claims in his first petition, they may be considered on the merits. LC. § 19-4908. 
The burden of establishing "sufficient reason" rests with Shackelford. Hooper v. State, 
127 Idaho 945, 948, 908 P.2d 1252 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Initially, Shackelford contends his "ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim could not have been raised in the first post-conviction petition because the appeal 
from the criminal conviction was heard at the same time as the appeal from the first post-
conviction proceedings under the special appellate and post-conviction procedures for 
capital cases." (Brief, p.35) (emphasis omitted). Even if Shackelford's argument is 
correct, see Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 57, 156 P.3d 552 (2007),judgment vacated 
on other grounds by Hairston v. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008) (because capital post-
conviction cases are governed by LC. § 19-2719, [i]neffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claims, by their very nature, cannot be raised in an initial post-conviction 
proceeding), none of the claims Shackelford has raised on appeal involve ineffective 
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assistance of appellate counsel claims. Rather, the claims involve four substantive claims 
two ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. 
Shackelford next contends ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is 
"sufficient reason," and attempts to distinguish Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 
P.3d 365 (2014), which overruled Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635 P.2d 955 
(1981). In Murphy, 156 Idaho at 395, the supreme court held, "because Murphy has no 
statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, she 
cannot demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a successive petition based on 
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel." Shackelford contends that, because the 
Idaho Supreme Court subsequently concluded capital post-conviction petitioners have a 
statutory right to conflict free counsel under LC.R. 44.2 that is evaluated under the Sixth 
Amendment, Hall v. State, 155 Idaho 610, 617, 315 P.3d 798 (2013), Murphy is 
inapposite because Shackelford' s first post-conviction case was a capital case governed 
by I.C.R. 44.2, while the rule in Murphy applies only to non-capital cases. (Brief, p.36.) 
Shackelford' s argument ignores the policies the supreme court examined in 
Murphy. Not only did the supreme court recognize there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
the appointment of counsel in post-conviction proceedings even in capital cases, the court 
discussed the policies behind that rule, explaining, "'The logic behind such a rule is that 
if counsel for post-conviction proceedings, as well as trial and direct appeal, must meet 
the same standards, then claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the immediate 
prior proceeding may be raised ad infinitum."' Id., 156 Idaho at 3 94 ( quoting Bejarano v. 
Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996)). As further discussed: 
"While it may be regrettable, we cannot guarantee every defendant 
effective counsel for every claim that may be raised. Defendants have 
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made a sham out of the system of justice and thwarted imposition of their 
ultimate penalty with continuous petitions for relief that often present 
claims without a legal foundation. As one court stated, 'We have created 
a web of procedures so involved that they threaten to engulf the penalty 
itself.' State v. Steffen, 70 Ohio St.3d 399, 639 N.E.2d 67, 73 (1994) 
(limiting post-conviction relief for capital cases)." 
Id. at 395 (quoting Bejarano, 929 P.2d at 925). 
Irrespective of LC.R. 44.2, this policy applies to Shackelford' s case, and explains 
why the Idaho Legislature earlier enacted LC. § 19-2719, which bars the filing of 
successive petitions in capital cases unless the claims were not known or could not 
reasonably have been known at the time of the first petition. LC. § 19-2719(3). As 
explained in Beam, 115 Idaho at 213 ( quotes omitted), "The underlying legislative 
purpose behind the statute stated the need to expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings 
and recognized the use of dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to thwart their 
sentences. The statute's purpose is to avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that 
all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one proceeding." Shackelford should 
not be permitted to thwart Murphy's mandate or the policies of LC. § 19-2719 by filing a 
successive petition challenging his underlying convictions and non-capital sentence 
merely because he was not given the death penalty when he was resentenced. 
However, even if this Court concludes ineffective assistance of post-conviction 
counsel is sufficient reason for the filing of the claims in Shackelford's Amended' 
Successive Petition, the district court should be affirmed because Shackelford has failed 
to establish the SAPD was ineffective during Shackelford's capital post-conviction case. 
First, the substantive claims Shackelford has raised - Claims A, C, E, and F - could not 
have been raised or they would have been summarily dismissed because of LC. § 19-
4901 (b ), which bars claims that can be raised on direct appeal from being litigated in 
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post-conviction. Because each of these claims could be raised on direct appeal, there was 
no basis for raising them during post-conviction proceedings. 
Second, Shackelford has failed to establish the SAPD was ineffective because he 
has not established deficient performance and prejudice as required under Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. 
1. Standards Of Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The purpose of effective assistance of counsel "is not to improve on the quality of 
legal representation ... [but] simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair 
trial." Cullen v. Pinholster, --- U.S.---, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Shackelford 
must show his counsel's representation was deficient and that the deficiency was 
prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
The first element "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment." Id. In making this determination, there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance fell within the "wide range of professional assistance." Id. at 689; 
see also Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 739) ("We strongly presume 'that counsel's representation was within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance."'). Shackelford has the burden of showing 
counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. 
The effectiveness of counsel's performance must be evaluated from his perspective at the 
time of the alleged error, not with twenty-twenty hindsight. Id. at 689. "Unlike a later 
reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials 
25 
outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 
judge." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). "There are countless ways to 
provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys 
would not defend a particular client in the same way." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. "The 
question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under 
prevailing professional norms, not whether it deviated from best practices or most 
common custom." Richter, 562 U.S. at 88. 
Strategic and tactical choices are "virtually unchallengeable" if made after 
investigation of the law and facts. Strickland at 690-91. Strategic choices made after less 
than complete investigation are unchallengeable if "reasonable professional judgments 
support the limitations on investigation." Id. "Rare are the situations in which the wide 
latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions will be limited to any one 
technique or approach." Richter, 562 U.S. at 89. Counsel is permitted to formulate a 
strategy that was reasonable at the time and "balance limited resources in accord with 
effective trial tactics and strategies." Id. 
In Strickland, the Court also discussed counsel's duty to conduct a "reasonable 
investigation," which does not mandate an "exhaustive investigation." As explained by 
the Supreme Court: 
[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In 
any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be 
directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
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In Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 
466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)), the Court concluded merely because counsel "could ... 
have made a more thorough investigation than he did," does not mandate relief because 
the courts "address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally 
compelled." Therefore, counsel is not required to "mount an all-out investigation into 
petitioner's background." This principle was reaffirmed in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 
374, 383 (2005), where the Court reiterated, "the duty to investigate does not force 
defense lawyers to scour the globe on the off chance something will turn up; reasonably 
diligent counsel may draw a line when they have good reason to think further 
investigation would be a waste." As explained in Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 
1173-74 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted) ( emphasis added), 
"While a lawyer is under a duty to make reasonable investigations, a lawyer may make a 
reasonable decision that particular investigations are unnecessary. To determine the 
reasonableness of a decision not to investigate, the court must apply a heavy measure of 
deference to counsel's judgments." 
The second element requires Shackelford to show "counsel's errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This requires Shackelford to demonstrate "a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome," id. at 694, which "requires a substantial, not just 
conceivable, likelihood of a different result," Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (quotes and 
citation omitted). A reviewing court "must consider the totality of the evidence before 
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the judge or jury," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, and reweigh that evidence "against the 
of available ... evidence," Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1408 (quoting Wiggins v. 
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)). 
2. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Ineffective Assistance Of Post-
Conviction Counsel 
a. Deficient Performance Of Post-Conviction Counsel 
As previously explained, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 
Shackelford has the burden of establishing both deficient performance and prejudice. 
While Idaho courts have generally addressed the prejudice prong associated with 
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel by addressing the merits of the 
underlying claim, it does not appear the courts have clearly addressed the issue of 
deficient performance with respect to post-conviction counsel in capital cases. 
As explained in Sexton, 679 F.3d at 1157 (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 
U.S. 111, 127 (2009)), post-conviction counsel "is not necessarily ineffective for failing 
to raise even a nonfrivolous claim," let alone a claim that is meritless. In other words, the 
standard for ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is analogous to the standard 
for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, where there is a Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel but no obligation to raise every nonfrivolous claim. Jones 
v. Barnes. 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983). "Experienced advocates since time beyond 
memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal 
and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues." Id. Based 
upon these standards, while it is still possible to raise ineffective assistance of appellate 
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counsel claims, "it is difficult to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent." Smith v. 
Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,288 (2000). 
These same standards are utilized in Idaho to address ineffective assistance of 
-
appellate counsel claims. See Daniels v. State, 156 Idaho 327, 330-31, 325 P.3d 668 (Ct. 
App. 2014); Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 386-88 (Ct. App. 2013). As explained in 
Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 164, 139 P.3d 762 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Yarborough v. 
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)), "When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of 
others, there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for tactical reasons rather than 
through sheer neglect." 
Through the SAPD, Shackelford filed a 108-page Third Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief (#31928, R., pp.2534-2641), that was followed by an addendum 
(id., pp.2980-90) and a motion to file a second addendum (id., pp.3175-82, 3196-3429). 
Based upon the sheer size of the Third Amended Petition and the time it took to file, 
coupled with the two addendums, it is difficult to envision how Shackelford has met his 
burden of establishing that any additional claims, including those from his Amended 
Successive Petition, were not winnowed out based upon tactical decisions. There is no 
indication that the claims in the Amended Successive Petition were omitted because of 
"inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective review." Dunlap v. State, 155 Idaho 345, 384, 313 P.3d 1 (2013). Indeed, as 
explained above, some of the claims from the Successive Amended Petition were actually 
raised in the Third Amended Petition or the subsequent addendums. Therefore, there can 
be no deficient performance on the part of post-conviction counsel when the claims were 
actually raised, but appellate counsel winnowed those claims on appeal. Because 
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Shackelford has failed to meet his burden of establishing post-conviction counsel's 
performance was deficient, he has failed to establish "sufficient reason" warranting the 
filing of a successive petition under LC. § 19-4908. 
b. Prejudice Involving Post-Conviction Counsel 
Because he has failed to establish relief would have been granted if any of the 
claims in his Amended Successive Petition had been raised during his post-conviction 
case ( assuming they were not raised), Shackelford cannot establish prejudice. 
Addressing Claim A, Shackelford contends the issues raised on direct appeal and 
the Amended Successive Petition are "distinctly different" because: 
The claim within the [Amended Successive Petition] boils down to 
the prejudice suffered by Shackelford at trial where the meaning of the 
jury instruction (a state law question) was distinguished from its impact on 
the trial (a federal/constitutional question). Instruction no. 33 created such 
ambiguity in the minds of the jurors when coupled with the conspiracy 
instructions - that at least one (1) juror ( a paralegal by profession) 
indicated that she would have voted not guilty on the First Degree Murder 
count (and by default, the Conspiracy to Commit First Degree Murder) but 
for Instruction No. 33. 
(Brief, p.8.) 
However, ambiguity associated with Instruction 33 was the very basis upon which 
the supreme court denied the claim, stating, "We find this instruction stated the 
applicable law as laid out in LC. § 19-1430 and Johnson. The instruction did not mislead 
the jury or fail to put Shackelford on notice of the charge because LC. § 19-1430 allows 
an aider and abettor to be charged as a principle." Shackelford I, 150 Idaho at 3 79. 
Moreover, Shackelford's attempt to distinguish between "accessories" and "aiders and 
abettors" is without merit because Instruction 33 did not address the question of whether 
he was an accessory, which is entirely different than an aider and abettor. (Compare LC. 
30 
§ 18-205 with Instruction 33.) Irrespective of whether the district court concluded that 
"principals and accessories are subsets of accomplice liability" (#42331, p.242), 
Shackelford would not have been granted relief based upon any alleged error associated 
with Instruction 3 3. 
Moreover, Shackelford's reliance upon information allegedly from a juror during 
the first post-conviction case is improper because it could not have been considered in 
determining whether there was error from Instruction 33. First, Shackelford's argument 
is not based upon first-hand information from the juror, but a note allegedly made by his 
trial attorney, which is obvious hearsay and would be inadmissible. (#31928, R., 
pp.3224, 3429.) Second, I.R.E. 606(b) prohibits a jury's verdict from being impeached 
by affidavit or otherwise except where the verdict was determined by chance or where the 
jury was improperly subjected to extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence. 
See State v. DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 354, 913 P.2d 568 (1996); State v. Scroggins, 91 
Idaho 847, 848, 333 P.2d 117 (1967); State v. Vaughn, 124 Idaho 576, 861 P.2d 1241 
(Ct. App. 1993). "Statements regarding any other aspect of the jury's deliberations are 
inadmissible to impeach the jury's verdict." State v. Webster, 123 Idaho 233, 236, 846 
P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1993). Because Claim A fails on the merits, Shackelford has failed to 
demonstrate prejudice. 
Shackelford next contends the district court "did not reference or otherwise rule 
on" Claim B. (Brief, p.10.) While the district court may not have expressly referenced 
the ineffective assistance aspect of the claim, it is clear the court implicitly rejected Claim 
B when it rejected Claim A. Indeed, Shackelford concedes Claim B was "originally 
presented to the district court in February 2005" in the second addendum. (Brief, p.10.) 
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While the district court denied Shackelford' s motion to add the claims from the second 
addendum, Shackelford failed to appeal that aspect of the district court's decision. 
Therefore, just like Claim A, Claim B was barred under res judicata. Regardless, 
because the underlying basis of Claim B is Claim A, and Claim A is without merit, 
Shackelford cannot establish prejudice. 
Claim C also fails because, even if the evidence was withheld ( which the state 
denies), Shackelford has failed to establish a reasonable probability of a different result as 
required under Brady and its progeny. See Kyles v. Whitlev, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) 
("Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a 'reasonable probability' of a different result, and 
the adjective is important."). As recognized by the district court (#42331, R., p.243), 
while Dr. Ciak testified that the Donna's cause of death was the shot to her neck, he also 
explained she was shot in the chest with a shotgun blast (#31928, Tr., pp.2178-96). 
Moreover, the evidence upon which Shackelford relies, the affidavit of Dr. Roderick 
Saxey, is unavailing. (#42331, R., p.224.) There is no information regarding Dr. Saxey's 
qualifications, how he arrived at his conclusion, what additional information he 
considered, or anything else other than a bare conclusion. Indeed, his opinion that "[t]he 
cause of the deformity and shearing is not evidence on the radiographs and may have 
been caused by ricochet of a hard object prior to entry into the body" is anything but 
conclusive. (Id.) ( emphasis added). Because Shackelford has failed to establish all the 
Brady elements, his claim fails resulting in his failure to establish Strickland prejudice. 
Claim D fails for the same reasons as Claim C - outside of Dr. Saxey' s affidavit, 
there is no evidence establishing what additional investigation regarding the ballistics 
data would have unearthed. Moreover, Dr. Saxey's affidavit is woefully inadequate to 
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establish that additional investigation would have resulted in a post-conviction claim that 
would have warranted a new trial by granting post-conviction relief based upon trial 
counsel's investigation regarding the ballistics evidence. 
Claim E raises a prosecutorial misconduct claim based upon alleged "vouching" 
that would not have succeeded during post-conviction proceedings. Because this is a 
substantive claim and trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's alleged vouching, 
this issue must be examined for fundamental error, State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, ---, 
348 P.3d 1, 46 (2015), which requires Shackelford to demonstrate the alleged error: "(1) 
violates one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,228,245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
"Prosecutorial misconduct" "does not, per se, violate a defendant's constitutional 
rights." Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 781 (9th Cir. 2012). Prosecutorial 
misconduct reaches the level of a constitutional violation only if the argument "so 
infect[ s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process," "misstate[ s] the evidence," or "implicate[ s] other specific rights of the accused 
such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent." Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986). "[I]t is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were 
undesirable or even universally condemned." Id. at 181. Rather, "the touchstone of due 
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, 
not the culpability of the prosecutor." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). In 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974), the Court explained: 
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The consistent and repeated misrepresentation of a dramatic exhibit in 
evidence may profoundly impress a jury and may have a significant 
impact on the jury's deliberations. Isolated passages of a prosecutor's 
argument, billed in advance to the jury as a matter of opinion not of 
evidence, do not reach the same proportions. Such arguments, like all 
closing arguments of counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto 
before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect 
and meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations in 
no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a court 
should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to 
have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy 
exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging 
interpretations. 
Shackelford's claim fails because he has not established prosecutorial misconduct, 
let alone fundamental error. Counsel have "considerable latitude in presenting their 
closing arguments and have the right to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, 
the evidence, inferences and deductions arising from the evidence." State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548, 566, 199 P.3d 123 (2008). Admittedly, closing arguments are not without 
limitation. As explained in State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583 (Ct. App. 
2007) (quotes and citations omitted): 
Closing argument should not include counsel's personal op1mons and 
beliefs about the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the 
accused. Nor should it include disparaging comments about opposing 
counsel, or inflammatory words employed in describing a witness or 
defendant. A closing argument may not misrepresent or mischaracterize 
the evidence, unduly emphasize irrelevant facts introduced at trial, refer to 
facts not in evidence, argue as substantive evidence matters admitted for 
limited evidentiary purposes, or misrepresent the law or the reasonable 
doubt burden. The credibility of a witness may not be bolstered or 
attacked by reference to religious beliefs, and appeals to racial or ethnic 
prejudices are prohibited. In a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly 
or indirectly comment on a defendant's invocation of his constitutional 
right to remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the purposes of 
inferring guilt. Lastly, and of particular importance to the present case, 
appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of 
inflammatory tactics are impermissible. 
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The state acknowledges "a prosecutor should avoid expressing a personal belief 
as to the credibility of a witness unless the comment is based solely on inferences from 
evidence presented at trial." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 786, 948 P.2d 127 (1997). 
However, that does not bar a prosecutor from "express[ing] an opinion in argument as to 
the truth or falsity of testimony ... when such opinion is based upon the evidence." State 
v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288, 178 P.3d 644 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Priest, 
128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624 (Ct. App. 1996) (while a prosecutor may not "express a 
personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence," a 
prosecutor may "express how, from [the prosecutor's] perspective, the evidence confirms 
or calls into doubt the credibility of a particular person"). A prosecutor's opinions and 
arguments do not constitute vouching unless the prosecutor interjects "personal belief' 
regarding the evidence or a witness' credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, or asks 
jurors "to make their decision based upon ... the prosecutor's self-proclaimed moral 
rectitude and integrity rather than addressing the evidence," State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 
20, 189 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2008). As explained in Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, improper 
vouching generally occurs when the prosecutor uses the words, "I think" or "I believe." 
To the extent they can even be ascertained in Shackelford's opening brief, the 
claims he raises do not constitute improper vouching. As recognized by the district court, 
"most of the offending statements cited by Shackelford recited evidence produced at trial 
and premised the credibility of the witnesses on their consistency with the evidence. 
Thus it appears that the prosecution's closing arguments were permissibly based upon 
reasonable inferences arising from the evidence presented." (#42331, R., pp.244-45.) 
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Because this claim would have failed if raised during post-conviction proceedings, 
Shackelford has not met his burden of establishing prejudice. 
Finally, in Claim F Shackelford contends he cannot be sentenced to fixed life for 
conspiracy to commit murder without the jury finding a statutory aggravating factor. 
(Brief, pp.23-26. )8 Shackelford has a fundamental misunderstanding of the penalties for 
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and the role of statutory aggravating factors. 
Idaho Code § 18-4004 states, "every person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be 
punished by death or by imprisonment for life." The statute further explains that if a 
statutory aggravator is found under LC. § 19-2515, but the fact-finder determines 
imposition of the death penalty would be unjust, the district court "shall impose a fixed 
life sentence." If a statutory aggravator is not found or the death penalty is not sought, 
"the court shall impose a life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less 
than ten (10) years." (Emphasis added). Idaho Code § 18-1701 explains that 
conspirators "each shall be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to the 
same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of Idaho for the punishment of the 
crime or offenses that each combined to commit." 
Therefore, while a fixed life sentence is mandatory if a notice of intent to seek 
the death penalty is filed and the state seeks the death penalty, the defendant is convicted 
of first-degree murder or conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and the fact-finder 
finds a statutory aggravating factor but concludes the death penalty is unjust, there is 
nothing prohibiting the district court from exercising its discretion and imposing a fixed 
life sentence whenever there has been a conviction for first-degree murder or conspiracy 
8 Shackelford makes the same claim with respect to his fixed life sentences imposed for 
Donna and Fred's murders after the resentencing, which will be addressed below. 
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to commit first-degree murder, irrespective of the other factors required for a mandatory 
fixed life sentence. State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, 680, 691 P.2d 1291 (Ct App. 1984); 
see also Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612,620,262 P.3d 255 (2011).9 
Therefore, because this claim would have failed if raised during post-conviction 
proceedings, Shackelford has not met his burden of establishing prejudice associated with 
post-conviction counsel's performance. 
II. 
Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing 
His Resentencing Petition 
On appeal, Shackelford has commingled the claim from his Amended Successive 
Petition dealing with his fixed life sentences for conspiracy to commit first-degree 
murder with his Resentencing Petition, which deals with his fixed life sentences for 
Donna and Fred's first-degree murders, contending a jury was required to find a statutory 
aggravating factor before fixed life sentences could be imposed. (Brief, pp.23-26.) 
Shackelford's claim is without merit. First, because this is a substantive claim, it is 
barred by LC. § 19-4901 (b) since it could have been raised on direct appeal. Second, 
even if not barred, it fails on the merits because there is nothing prohibiting the district 
court from exercising its discretion and imposing a fixed life sentence. 
As detailed above, this claim is barred by I. C. § 19-4901 (b) because it is a 
substantive claim that should have been raised in Shackelford's direct appeal. Indeed, at 
his resentencing Shackelford raised this very issue (#39398, R., pp.36-42, 99-101, 120-
125), but failed to raise it on direct appeal. Because Shackelford has articulated no 
9 A mandatory fixed life sentence could not have been imposed because the amendments 
to LC. § 18-4004 were not enacted until 2003, well after Shackelford murdered Donna 
and Fred, which would have resulted in a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 
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reason why this claim could not have been raised in his direct appeal, its dismissal should 
be affirmed. See Barcella, 148 Idaho at 474 ("Barcella did not articulate any reason or 
point to any allegation or evidence as to why the claim should survive the bar of LC. § 
19-490l(b)."). 
As explained above, this claim also fails on the merits because there is nothing in 
LC. § 18-4004 requiring a jury to find statutory aggravating factor before the district 
court can exercise its discretion and impose a fixed life sentence for first-degree murder, 
particularly when the state withdraws its notice of intent to seek the death penalty and no 
longer pursues the death penalty. See Booth, 151 Idaho at 620. Because Shackelford's 
claim fails as a matter of law, he has not met his burden of establishing the district court 
erred by dismissing this claim in his Resentencing Petition. 
III. 
Shackelford Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For Counsel 
During His Successive Post-Conviction Case 
A. Introduction 
In denying Shackelford's request for counsel in his successive post-conviction 
case, the district court stated, "It is ORDERED that Shackelford's motion for court 
appointed counsel is DENIED. LC. § 19-852(2)(c)." (#42331, R., p.247.) Shackelford 
contends the district court erred in denying him post-conviction counsel because the court 
did not rule on his motion prior to summarily dismissing his Amended Successive 
Petition, failed to give advance notice of its reasons for denying counsel, relied upon LC. 
§ 19-852(2)( c ), and he alleged facts that would lead to the possibility of a valid claim. 
Any error associated with the district court's denial of Shackelford's motion is 
harmless. Moreover, the state's pleadings provided him with adequate notice. The court 
38 
did not erroneously rely upon § 19-852(2)(c), but any alleged error in relying upon 
§ 19-852(2)( c) is harmless because Shackelford failed to allege facts that would lead 
to the possibility of a valid claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A decision to grant or deny a request for counsel in post-conviction cases is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393. 
C. Shackelford Was Not Entitled To Counsel To Represent Hirn During His 
Successive Petition Case 
"A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is 
governed by I.C. § 19-4904, which provides that in proceedings under the UPCPA, a 
court-appointed attorney 'may be made available' to an applicant who is unable to pay 
the costs of representation." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393 (quoting LC. § 19-4904; citing 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792). "The standard for determining whether to appoint 
counsel for an indigent petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding is whether the petition 
alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim." Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393 (citing 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 529). "In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the 
possibility of a valid claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are 
such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to 
conduct a further investigation into the claims." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 
152 P.3d 12 (2007). The appointment of counsel is not appropriate for the purpose of 
searching the record for potentially nonfrivolous claims; rather, the petition itself must 
allege the facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim before the appointment of 
counsel is warranted. Murphy, 156 Idaho at 393 (citing Swader, 143 Idaho at 654). 
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Admittedly, the district court did not rule on Shackelford's motion for 
appointment of counsel prior to dismissing petition, but denied his motion in the same 
Order that the court denied post-conviction relief. (#42331, R., p.247.) However, as 
explained in Hurst v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 685, 214 P.3d 668 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 
Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467,469, 926 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1996)), this error must be 
examined for harmlessness, which requires examination of Shackelford's Amended 
Successive Petition '"to determine whether it presents any colorably meritorious claim, 
the presentation of which might have been enhanced by the assistance of counsel."' 
As detailed above, none of the claims in Shackelford' s Amended Successive 
Petition are "colorably meritorious" because they are barred by LC. § 19-4901 (b ), res 
judicata, and LC. § 19-4908. Because of these procedural bars, his claims "are so 
patently frivolous that they simply cannot be developed into viable claims even with the 
assistance of counsel." Hurst, 147 Idaho at 685. Even on appeal, Shackelford's appellate 
counsel moved to withdraw because counsel "determined that [he] cannot file an opening 
brief raising all the issues [ ] Shackelford wishes to present to the Court and comply with 
I.AR. ll.2(a)." (Appendix A, p.l.) Because Shackelford's claims are "patently 
frivolous," any error associated with the denial of his request for counsel is harmless. 
Shackelford's claim regarding advance notice is likewise without merit. As 
detailed above, while the district court did not give advance notice, the state gave 
sufficient notice by filing an answer and a Motion for Summary Dismissal that detailed 
all of the bases for dismissing Shackelford's Amended Successive Petition. See 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 523-24. 
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Shackelford's contention regarding LC. § 19-852(2)(c) is likewise without merit 
Denial of court appointed counsel under § 19-852(2)(c)10 is "within the court's 
discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims presented are 
frivolous." Swisher, 129 Idaho at 468-69. When the district court cited LC. § 19-
852(2)( c ), it was merely recognizing the necessity of considering "whether the facts 
alleged are such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain 
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims." Swader, 143 Idaho at 654. 
The court's analysis regarding Shackelford's individual claims was an appropriate 
finding that each claim is frivolous. Therefore, the court's citation of LC.§ 19-852(2)(c) 
was not error. Irrespective, any alleged error was harmless since Shackelford has failed 
to establish the possibility of a valid claim because, as detailed above, the claims he 
raised in his Amended Successive Petition are barred by LC. § 19-4901 (b ), res judicata, 
and/or LC. § 19-4908. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's dismissal 
of Shackelford's Amended Successive Petition, the denial of his request for counsel, and 
the dismissal of his Resentencing Petition. 
DATEDthis 17llidayofSeptember,~;  
L. LaMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General and 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
10 Prior to July 2013, the statutory provision for the appointment of counsel in post-
conviction proceedings was codified at LC. § 19-852(b)(3). Effective July 2013, that 
provision was re-designated as LC. § 19-852(2)(c). See 2013 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 220, 
§ 2, p.515. 
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below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following: 
Dale C. Shackelford, #64613 
I.S.C.C. 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83 707 
X U.S. Mail 
__ Hand Delivery 
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Electronic Court Filing 
--
~-~ 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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